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New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law
Institute Faces the Derivative Action
By John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Nothing in The American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (Principles) proved more contro-
versial than the effort to develop fair and balanced standards for the
derivative action. Only the topic of corporate takeovers seems to evoke
an equally intense level of emotion among corporate lawyers. Not sur-
prisingly then, Part VII (Remedies) of the Principles attracted the same
attention from critics that a lightning rod does in a thunderstorm.
Unlike other ALI Restatements, however, the Principles also encoun-
tered a professional opposition, which lobbied against its adoption, both
inside and outside the ALI, on behalf of various outside groups. The
central charge of these critics, repeated endlessly and loudly, was that the
Principles in general, and Part VII in particular, relied on a "litigation
model of corporate governance," which distrusted directors and asked
courts to manage the corporation.'
Within the ALI, these pejorative charges never worked. The ALI's mem-
bers read the Reporters' drafts, heard the floor debate, and resoundingly
defeated, year after year, the motions advanced by The Business Round-
table's spokespersons. In turn, the Reporters listened to the ALI's com-
ments and criticisms (and also those of CORPRO, the ABA liaison com-
mittee to the Project), rephrased and fine-tuned their drafts, until
eventually a compromise position was reached that received the approval
of an overwhelming majority of the ALI's members.
Although the process worked internally, the result has been more am-
biguous outside the ALI. Few business lawyers who were not ALI members
had the time to read the various Tentative Drafts, and neither the ALI
*Professor Coffee is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School,
and served as Reporter for Part VII of THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31,
1992) [hereinafter Principles].
1. See, e.g, Eighth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series: ALl Corporate Governance
Project: Panel Discussion, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 319, 336 (1983) (comments of Harvard Business
Professor Kenneth Andrews). For a similar viewpoint, see Michael Dooley, Two Models of
Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAw. 461 (1992).
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nor its academic Reporters were in a position to counter the steady stream
of memoranda and booklets disseminated by the Principles' professional
critics. Because of this negative publicity campaign, many lawyers are fa-
miliar with the Principles only from the heated denunciations of it that
they received in the mail. This Article is written for those in this group
who have been perplexed by the ALI Corporate Governance Project.
Clearly, they know that the ALI is not given to radicalism; nothing about
it even qualifies for the word "trendy." Temperamentally, the ALI is cau-
tious and conservative in its pronouncements. Why then has it aroused
controversy in the corporate governance area?
The answer cannot be that the Principles reflect some radical departure
from existing law. Not only is the ALI not given to such deviations, but
it is easy to point to recent cases that set forth far more demanding sub-
stantive standards 2 or pose greater procedural standards 3 before a deriv-
ative action can be dismissed. For those willing to read and compare these
cases against the Principles, it will be apparent that the ALI has steered
an intermediate course between the extreme positions in the case law. Part
of the problem may be that few business lawyers have the time to familiarize
themselves with the case law in this area and are thus at the mercy of
oversimplifying critics who wish to portray the ALI position as radical.
Given these time contraints, this Article will not attempt a section-by-
section exegesis of Part VII of the Principles, but rather will attempt to
explain its basic approach and the policy premises underlying that ap-
proach. To be sure, there are trade-offs, and many may well prefer a more
conservative approach that effectively forecloses the possibility of share-
holder litigation. But what cannot be said (at least not honestly) is that the
Principles idealize derivative litigation. Rather, they clearly recognize that
a litigation cost differential favoring the plaintiffs is frequently at work,
that it can operate to produce settlements unrelated to the merits, and
that exposure to liability for ordinary business decisions can make directors
excessively risk averse or cause them to flee the board.4
These arguments do not mean, however, that the baby should be thrown
out with the bath by denying shareholders any realistic access to a litigation
2. For recent decisions imposing higher substantive standards before the court may dismiss
a derivative action, see Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Alford
v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 325-28 (N.C. 1987). Both decisions also reject any "demand re-
quired, demand excused" distinction under which the court's review of the substantive jus-
tifications for dismissal is confined to instances in which demand was excused. Indeed, even
under Delaware law, the standard of substantive review is sometimes higher than under the
Principles, because when demand is excused, Delaware law permits the court to exercise its
own "independent business judgment." See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789
(Del. 1981). This independent business judgment standard is never applicable under Part
VII of the Principles.
3. See Will v. Engebretson & Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). This decision
is discussed infra notes 108-109.
4. See Principles, supra note *, pt. VII Introductory Note, at 588-90.
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remedy; rather, they imply that the remedy's scope should be confined to
and focused on those areas where other mechanisms of corporate ac-
countability do not work sufficiently well to make a litigation remedy su-
perfluous. Such areas survive, in part, because collective action by share-
holders remains costly and is sometimes infeasible. Within these areas-
whose core is defined by the traditional area of self-dealing and the duty
of loyalty-the ALI's position is that a need persists for a measure of
judicial oversight. If the Principles are controversial, it is because they do
not see the existence of independent directors as a complete and wholly
preemptive substitute for judicial oversight of self-dealing.
Why not? Some would respond with lengthy organizational, psycholog-
ical, or sociological critiques of the board's capability or objectivity.5 That
was not, however, the judgment that moved the Reporters or the vast
majority of the ALI's members. Probably more than anything else, in my
judgment, a conservative political judgment shaped the thinking of most
of the ALI's members-the business judgment rule traditionally and wisely
has stopped short of covering the approval of self-dealing transactions.
Many felt that extending the business judgment rule into that context
ultimately would weaken it. Like the proverbial rubber band, it could snap
if it were stretched too far. More specifically, the long-term result of such
an extension predictably would be that courts would graft exceptions and
conditions onto the rule. In short, the danger in attempting to make the
business judgment rule universally applicable was that it could become a
meaningless standard that courts would overwhelm with judicially created
conditions. Symptomatically, there are signs that this is precisely what is
happening today to the Delaware standard for derivative actions when that
standard is interpreted by federal courts in diversity cases.5
In this light, the debate between the ALI and The Business Roundtable
positions on the appropriate scope of the business judgment rule is ba-
sically a disagreement over whether the legitimacy of the business cor-
poration should rest solely on a single premise (i.e., the capacity of in-
dependent directors to manage all aspects of corporate affairs) or whether
additional safeguards remain prudent. Without doubting the importance
of independent directors, the ALI view is that corporate governance rests
on a stronger, more stable foundation for the long-run when the law
permits a limited role for judicial oversight.
Part VII attempts, however, to limit that judicial role by focusing chiefly
on the duty of loyalty and certain closely related areas (such as knowing
illegality). In so doing, Part VII articulates several basic policy judgments:
5. For an elaborate summary of these arguments, see James Cox & Harry L. Munsinger,
Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985).
6. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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(1) The primary role of the derivative action is to enforce the duty
of loyalty, not the duty of care, because other mechanisms of ac-
countability outperform litigation in enforcing the duty of care;
(2) Liability for due care violations should be capped at a level
commensurate with the defendant's culpability and the expected ben-
efits from corporate office;
(3) The procedures applicable to the derivative action should create
an early screening mechanism that places the directors' actual re-
sponse to the plaintiff's demand at center stage; and
(4) The standard of review of the board's or committee's motion
to dismiss a derivative action should integrate and be consistent with
the standard of review applicable to the underlying transaction or
conduct at issue; thus, in a duty of care case, the business judgment
rule should normally govern, but in a duty of loyalty case, the court
should be authorized to review the justifications advanced for the
dismissal of the derivative action to the same extent as it would review
the fairness of the underlying transaction.7
Some of these ideas are now familiar (for example, an early version of
section 7.19 of the Principles served as the model for section 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, which authorizes charter amend-
ments eliminating due care liability)." Other ideas, such as "universal de-
mand," remain controversial, but are gaining some legislative acceptance. 9
Still, other provisions now are beginning to attract support from state
courts. 10
7. Principles, supra note *, pt. VII.
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) authorizes a charter provision reducing or
eliminating financial liability of corporate directors, except for liability resulting from certain
specified categories of misbehavior. An early discussion draft of what became § 7.19 of the
Principles was provided to the drafting committee of the Delaware bar that proposed
§ 102(b)(7). Section 7.19 does not permit complete exculpation of due care liability (as
§ 107(b)(7) does), but only authorizes a ceiling on due care liability for both officers and
directors. Several other states seem to have patterned their statutes even more closely after
the ALl model. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1992); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 204(a)(1 0) (Deering 1993). See generally James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Leg-
islation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207 (1988).
9. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr. § 7.42 (1989) [hereinafter Model Act] followed an earlier
ALI proposal and requires demand on the board in all cases before a derivative action is
filed. Several states enacted versions of § 7.42. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-742 (Michie
1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.07401(2) (West 1992). Although the Model Act differs signif-
icantly from § 7.03 of the Principles in failing to provide for substantive judicial review of
the board's response to the demand, the idea of universal demand originated with the ALI
Corporate Governance Project. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711,
1722 n.2 (1991).
10. Several decisions already followed (or at least expressed agreement with) the ALI's
standards on termination of derivative litigation. See Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 327
(N.C. 1987) (expressly rejecting the "demand required/demand excused" distinction and
requiring substantive judicial evaluation of the merits in all cases before a derivative action
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For the future, the Principles probably represent the leading alternative
to the well developed Delaware case law, particularly with regard to de-
rivative actions. In jurisdictions where the law remains undeveloped, courts
will face a choice between the ALI's approach and Delaware's approach.
Thus, this Article will use Delaware law as a point of reference. Its intent
is not to attack Delaware law, 1' but to explore and contrast the general
approaches of Delaware and the ALl on a policy level.
A COMPARISON OF THE ALl AND DELAWARE
TREATMENT OF DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
THE DELAWARE PROCEDURE
Under Delaware law, the principal screening device for winnowing de-
rivative actions is supplied by the "demand required/demand excused"
distinction.' 2 When demand on the board is required, the board's response
to the demand is governed by the business judgment rule,'" and in such
cases plaintiffs usually face an insuperable barrier. Thus, the critical ques-
tion becomes when will demand on the board be excused as futile.
Here, the law of individual states varies considerably. Originally, early
Delaware cases on demand futility focused on whether the board would
can be dismissed); Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Houle v. Low, 556
N.E.2d 51, 59 (Mass. 1990) (the reviewing court must determine "whether the committee
reached a reasonable and principled decision"); see also Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate,
Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983); Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1988). To this author's knowledge, no state court yet has expressed its disagreement
with the Principles.
11. In fairness, it must be acknowledged that Delaware's law on derivative actions is in
some respects more favorable to plaintiffs than that of other jurisdictions (most notably, New
York). For example, under New York law, the determination of a special litigation committee
to seek dismissal of a derivative action must be accorded business judgment rule deference.
See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). In contrast, Delaware law permits
the court considerable discretion in reviewing such a determination and even speaks of the
court using its own "independent business judgment." See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The Principles do not go this far, but they do extend substantive judicial
review to the justifications for dismissal to all well-pled derivative actions raising certain
specified claims. See infra text accompanying notes 59-70. Since 1984, Delaware law largely
eclipsed the significance of the Zapata decision by raising the showing necessary to excuse
demand. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). In contrast, New York law is far
more liberal on the excuse of demand, and the New York case law reveals that demand is
excused regularly. See, e.g., Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1975); Schmidt v. Mag-
netic Head Corp., 476 N.Y.S.2d 151, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Davidowitz v. Edelman,
583 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
12. Delaware is not unique in this regard, although its standard for finding demand to be
futile is considerably more unfavorable to plaintiffs than that of other jurisdictions, such as
New York. See supra note 11. For an overview of the demand rule, see Note, Demand on
Directors and Shareholders As a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1960);
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
13. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990) (when a shareholder makes
demand, the shareholder "tacitly acknowledges the absence of facts to support a finding of
futility"); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 212 (Del. 1991).
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be hostile to the action, i.e., was the board predisposed to resist the liti-
gation?14 In a significant doctrinal shift in 1984, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court limited the circumstances under which demand would be
excused. In Aronson v. Lewis, 15 the court shifted the focus from the board's
predisposition towards the action to whether the directors' conduct fell
within the protection of the business judgment rule.16 The test has two
alternative prongs, either of which, if satisfied, excuse demand:
[I]n determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the proper
exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the particular-
ized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors
are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction
was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.'I
Under Aronson's first prong, the plaintiff must allege particularized facts
that indicate that a majority of the board had a financial interest in the
challenged transaction or otherwise lacked independence. 18 This is a severe
test, which rarely can be satisfied in the case of a publicly held corporation
having a board with a majority of outside directors.
Aronson's second prong, however, has proven more of a wild card. Under
this prong, even directors who are financially disinterested can be dis-
qualified if the plaintiff pleads particularized facts showing that the di-
rectors failed to exercise proper business judgment. '9 Specifically, plaintiffs
avoid the necessity of demand if they can plead "particularized facts cre-
ating a reasonable doubt as to the 'soundness' of the challenged transaction
sufficient to rebut the presumption that the business judgment rule at-
taches to the transaction. '20 The ambiguities in this second prong have
been noted and criticized by others,2 1 but the relevant point here is that
this standard is susceptible to highly variant interpretation and applica-
tion.22 Thus, even if the judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery un-
14. See, e.g., Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. 1927).
15. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
16. Id. at 814.
17. Id.
18. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Del. 1984). When a claim is made that
the majority of the board lacks independence, the plaintiff must allege particularized facts
showing that the board is "dominated by an officer or director who is the proponent of the
challenged transaction" or that it is "so under his influence that its discretion is sterilize[d]."
Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del. 1991).
19. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988).
20. Levine, 591 A.2d at 205-06.
21. See, e.g., Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1174 (7th Cir. 1989).
22. This potential for variant interpretation was heightened further by the most recent
Delaware Supreme Court decision on demand, which emphasizes the "highly factual nature
of the inquiry" in which the court must engage when demand futility is alleged. Heineman
v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 953 (Del. 1992). Although Heineman clearly seems to be
the appropriate outcome on its facts, its language predictably will produce a variety of in-
terpretations in federal diversity cases.
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derstand Aronson and interpret it consistently, federal district courts ap-
plying Delaware law in diversity cases demonstrably do not-as recent cases
have indicated. 23 In particular, the meaning of the term reasonable doubt
and the quantum of particularization necessary to rebut the presumption
in favor of the board are undefined and invite inherently subjective re-
sponses from other courts.2 4
Arguably, the open-textured latitude inherent in Aronson's test may be
its saving grace. In the hands of an independent, strong-willed judge, the
decision can be read to preserve some judicial discretion. Thus, the harsh-
ness of the Aronson decision is mitigated by the unpredictability of the test
that it formulates. Indeed, federal courts applying Aronson recently excused
demand in cases where little board involvement was shown. 25 For precisely
this reason, however, the frequency with which federal courts cite the
Aronson formula is misleading because the Aronson test ultimately is an
empty one that seldom dictates the result in a specific case. A strongjudge
usually can manipulate a "reasonable doubt" standard to reach the out-
come that he or she desires. 26
Doctrinally, the real bite in the Delaware formula is its waiver rule, which
faces the plaintiff with a "Catch 22"-like dilemma: If the plaintiff does not
make demand on the board, the plaintiff must overcome the Aronson test;
but if the plaintiff does make demand, the plaintiff thereby concedes the
disinterestedness of the board. 27 Because of this constructive "waiver" of
all challenges to the board's objectivity, plaintiffs who make demand may
only attack the board's rejection of demand by raising the functional equiv-
alent of Aronson's second prong and attacking the good faith and reason-
ableness of the board's investigation.28 Sometimes (but rarely), plaintiffs
have succeeded in challenging the reasonableness or good faith of the
board's response to demand.29 Still, there is a sufficient disincentive in the
23. See RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1991) (a case in which
I doubt that Delaware courts would have excused demand); see also infra note 26.
24. This is especially true because, under conventional pleading, almost any well-pled
relevant fact is sufficient to overcome a presumption, which in theory operates only to allocate
the burden of production and to resolve the case in the rare event that the evidence is in
equipoise. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the BusinessJudgment Rule,
supra p. 1337.
25. See, e.g., In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Colo. 1992);
Miller v. Loucks, No. 91C 6539, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16966 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1992).
26. Both Storage Technology Corp. and Miller fit this pattern. I doubt that demand would
be excused on the facts of either case in the Delaware Court of Chancery. See supra note 25
and accompanying text.
27. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d
194, 212 (Del. 1991).
28. Levine, 591 A.2d at 212.
29. See, e.g., Miller v. Loucks, No. 91C 6539, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16966 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 3, 1992); Abrams v. Koether, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,995 (D.N.J. Aug. 10,
1992); Thorpe v. Cerbco, 611 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1991). Attacks on the board's rejection of
demand, however, have been more successful in other jurisdictions. See Country Nat'l Bank
v. Mayer, 788 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
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Delaware "waiver" rule as to produce an entirely predictable consequence:
Plaintiffs today seldom make demand in Delaware, but instead litigate the
issue of whether demand was excused.
Delaware's demand rule also results in a substantial amount of collateral
litigation and sometimes can be a trap for the unwary. For example, issues
arise as to (i) whether a skeptical or protesting letter from a shareholder
constitutes a demand (thereby waiving the issue of board independence)
or only a request for information;30 (ii) whether a non-specific letter from
a shareholder is too indefinite to constitute a demand (and thus requires
no board response);3' (iii) how long after demand the plaintiff must wait
for a response before filing its action;32 (iv) how broadly a demand letter
relates when there are multiple issues; 3" and (v) what effect does demand
have when there is a subsequent change in the composition of the board.3 4
Nonetheless, the shareholder plaintiff usually faces an unattractive choice:
either (i) not make demand and thereby accept the burden of convincing
the court that seemingly respectable directors should be deemed too biased
even to deserve an opportunity to respond to demand, or (ii) make demand
and thereby acknowledge the applicability of the business judgment rule
to the directors' decision whether or not to reject demand (and, for most
practical purposes, concede the outcome of the case).
Should the plaintiff survive the significant obstacle of the demand rule,
Delaware law then becomes considerably fairer. Under Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,s5 even when demand is excused as futile, the "interested"
board can appoint a special litigation committee of disinterested directors,
which can review the action and recommend its dismissal.3 6 In Zapata, the
Delaware Supreme Court adopted a two-step test for review of the com-
mittee's decision. First, the court must inquire into the committee's in-
dependence and good faith and examine the bases supporting the com-
mittee's conclusions.37 Second, the court may, in its discretion, apply its
own "independent business judgment" to determine whether the motion
should be granted, and, in so doing, may give special consideration to
30. Compare Rubin v. Posner, 701 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (D. Del. 1988) (court found demand
had been made); Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1116-17 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985) (same) with Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 141 (3d
Cir. 1978) (court found demand had not been made); Brook v. Acme Steel Co., No. 10276,
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 61 (May 11, 1989) (same).
31. Cf Seidel v. Public Serv. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D.N.H. 1985) (demand letter
insufficient under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1).
32. Compare Rubin v. Posner, 701 F. Supp, 1041, 1046 (D. Del. 1988) (27 days sufficient
period) with Mozes v. Welch, 638 F. Supp. 215, 220-22 (D. Conn. 1986) (eight months
insufficient).
33. Cf Abrams v. Koether, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,995 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1992).
34. Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp 237, 257 (D.N.J. 1991) (earlier decision).
35. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
36. Id. at 785-86.
37. Id. at 788.
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matters of law and public policy."8 Although the Zapata standard strikes a
reasonably fair balance, the Aronson decision largely eclipsed the signifi-
cance of the earlier Zapata test. Even when Zapata is applicable, the process
still can take as long as several years between the making of demand and
the date on which the special litigation committee renders its report-and
even longer before the action reaches the trial stage if the court declines
to dismiss.19
THE AL'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Demand and Demand Rejections
The ALI's approach to the derivative action differs fundamentally at the
outset from that of Delaware by abandoning the traditional distinction
between "demand required" and "demand excused." Instead, section 7.03
requires demand in every case.40 In instances where "irreparable injury"
would otherwise result, demand may be made after the filing of the ac-
tion.41
The case for the ALI's "universal demand" standard rests on several
overlapping justifications. First, the potential for collateral, sidebar liti-
gation is reduced. To be sure, there still will be an important and much
litigated issue under the ALI approach, but it will involve the central
question of the board's or committee's justifications for dismissal of the
action. Many of the peripheral issues that frequently are litigated today
(such as whether a demand must be made, what making a demand con-
cedes, the issues to which the demand did or did not relate, and whether
shareholders who did not make demand can attack the board's indepen-
dence when other shareholders did make demand), can be simply sides-
tepped.
Second, by making demand obligatory, the ALI approach shifts the focus
from the potential capacity of the board to evaluate the derivative action
to its actual response to the demand. The great failure of the "demand
required/demand excused" approach is that for all its rhetorical deference
to the board of directors it actually minimizes the board's role in the
litigation. Because plaintiffs today do not make demand (in order not to
38. Id. at 789.
39. In Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 511 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del.
1985), Chancellor Brown noted that it took three years between the date of filing of the
amended complaint and the date of his decision on the litigation committee's report. More
than an additional year passed before the Delaware Supreme Court upheld his decision
granting the committee's motion. Had the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor,
it is easy to imagine a total period of five or more years before plaintiffs could have proceeded
to discovery and trial. Although such a delay would chill the efforts of many plaintiffs (and
their lawyers), it also is true that the existence of asymmetric litigation costs could allow some
plaintiffs to exploit this cost differential to obtain a settlement unrelated to the merits.
40. See Principles, supra note *, § 7.03(a).
41. Id. § 7.03(b).
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concede the board's independence), the only issue that the court can ex-
amine is whether the board was disinterested. This is a speculative, "what-
if" inquiry because the board never actually receives the opportunity to
respond to the demand that was not made. In short, the actual (if unin-
tended) consequence of the prevailing demand rule is to short-circuit the
board out of the decisional process and to leave only the court to pass
judgment. In contrast, by mandating demand in all cases, the ALI approach
allows the court to review not simply the independence level of the board,
but also the procedures it followed in responding to demand and its actual
substantive justifications for rejection. The difference is between a con-
strained form of "phantom" judicial review that is limited to the board's
alleged financial and other conflicts of interest, and a fuller review that
includes consideration of the board's actual deliberation. More impor-
tantly, under the Delaware procedures, the board may never even learn
of the action and will not be required to evaluate its allegations because
counsel to the corporation can challenge the plaintiff's predictable failure
to make demand on the board without consulting the board in any real
detail.
Finally, the Delaware demand rule places excessive weight on an arbi-
trary and often trivial boundary. Consider, for example, a thirteen-person
board. Suppose that the court finds that seven directors are disinterested
and independent and six are not. Under the Aronson rule, demand is re-
quired, and thus the action must be dismissed. Conversely, if the court
finds only six directors are disinterested and independent and seven in-
terested or not independent, then demand is excused, and the action may
continue. Yet, the difference between these two boards is unlikely to be
substantial. Boundary problems are endemic in the law, but a goal of
reform should be to reduce the weight placed on arbitrary boundaries.
The conclusion that the Delaware demand rule provides a flawed screen-
ing mechanism does not imply, however, what should replace it. Indeed,
the ALI's major policy premise is that no single screening test exists that
can be employed wisely across all contexts to separate out those actions
that should go forward from those that should be terminated. Context
counts because the costs and benefits of a litigation remedy also vary with
the context. Thus, Part VII draws a sharp distinction between the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty (which it terms the "duty of fair dealing").
Although this distinction is made at several points, the most important
juncture arises when the disinterested directors respond to the plaintiff's
demand. Here, section 7.04(a) governs both the particularity with which
the plaintiff must plead its case and how the plaintiff must respond to the
rejection of the demand. It provides:
(a) Particularity: demand rejection
(1) In general. The complaint shall plead with particularity facts that,
if true, raise a significant prospect that the conduct or transaction
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complained of did not meet the applicable requirements of Parts IV
(Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule), V (Duty of Fair
Dealing), or VI (Role of Directors and Shareholders in Transactions
in Control and Tender Offers), in light of any approvals of the conduct
or transaction communicated to the plaintiff by the corporation.
(2) Demand rejection. If a corporation rejects the demand made on
the board pursuant to section 7.03, and if, at or following the rejec-
tion, the corporation delivers to the plaintiff a written reply to the
demand which states that the demand was rejected by directors who
were not interested [section 1.23] in the transaction or conduct de-
scribed in and forming the basis for the demand and that such di-
rectors constituted a majority of the entire board and were capable
as a group of objective judgment in the circumstances, and provides
specific reasons for those statements, then the complaint shall also
plead with particularity facts that, if true, raise a significant prospect:
(A) That the statements in the reply are not correct; or
(B) If Part IV, V or VI provides that the underlying transaction or
conduct would be reviewed under the standard of the business
judgment rule, that the rejection did not satisfy the requirements
of the business judgment rule as specified in section 4.01(c); or
(C) If Part IV, V, or VI provides that the underlying transaction or
conduct would be reviewed under a standard other than the busi-
ness judgment rule, either (i) that the disinterested directors who
rejected the demand did not satisfy the good faith and informational
requirements [section 4.01 (c)(2)] of the business judgment rule or
(ii) that disinterested directors could not reasonably have deter-
mined that rejection of the demand was in the best interest of the
corporation. If the complaint fails to set forth sufficiently such
particularized facts, defendants shall be entitled to dismissal of the
complaint prior to discovery. 42
Unquestionably, the foregoing provision is a textual mouthful, but in sub-
stance it establishes both who can reject demand and what the plaintiff
must plead to overcome that rejection. In essence, it contains the following
rules:
1. Rejection of demand by the board only will be given legal effect
if a majority of the board's directors are both not "interested" in
the action 43 and "capable of objective judgment in the circum-
42. Id. § 7.04(a).
43. The term interested is defined in § 1.23 of the Principles. A special provision (§ 1.23(c))
applies only for purposes of Part VII and provides that a director is not "interested" in the
action simply because of the fact the director is named as a defendant in the action if two
conditions are satisfied: (1) The action "is based only on the fact that the director approved
of or acquiesced in, or took action with respect to, the transaction or conduct that is the
subject of the action," and (2) the action "does not otherwise allege with particularity facts
not patently false, that raise a clear likelihood that the director would be adjudged liable to
the corporation or its shareholders." Id. § 1.23(c).
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stances." 44 Both these tests are marginally more rigorous on de-
fendants than the Delaware standard for demand futility, but they
will not disqualify outside directors absent concrete specific evi-
dence indicating bias or a lack of objectivity.
2. If the transaction is a self-dealing transaction that the Principles
elsewhere subject to a limited fairness review, then the directors'
rejection of demand is correspondingly made subject to an objec-
tive standard of fairness (i.e., could the directors "reasonably have
determined that rejection of the demand was in the best interests
of the corporation"). 45 In addition, the disinterested directors also
must satisfy the business judgment rule by adequately informing
themselves.
3. Conversely, in a simple business judgment case, the rejection of
demand will be dispositive unless the board's response fails even
the deferential test of the business judgment rule.
Therefore, the ALI's two principal departures from Delaware law are (i)
universal demand, 4 and (ii) an explicit dichotomy between a "reasona-
bleness" standard of review (applicable largely to fair dealing cases and
cases involving knowing violations of law) and a "business judgment" stan-
dard (applicable to duty of care cases and certain fair dealing cases where
a business judgment standard governs).47 Under both the ALI and Dela-
ware approaches, there is, however, one procedural similarity: the plaintiff
need not actually prove anything to survive the demand rejection stage.
In Delaware, the judicial determination is made on the basis of the plead-
ings, and the plaintiff need raise only a "reasonable doubt" by pleading
particularized facts. 8 Similarly, under the ALI approach, the plaintiff's
obligation at the demand stage is to raise by particularized pleadings a
"significant prospect" that (in a fair dealing case) the board "unreason-
ably" rejected demand. 49
44. The Commentary to § 7.09 explains this concept. See Principles, supra note *, § 7.09
cmt. g. Essentially, there are two elements to this standard. The directors must "be able to
understand and evaluate the transaction at issue" and they must lack other relationships to
the defendant that might "bias the inquiry." Id. An example is given in the Commentary to
§ 7.09 of individuals who were long-time personal friends and neighbors; in such a case,
each might lack the objective capacity to evaluate the other's conduct.
45. See id. § 7.04(a)(2)(C).
46. Id. § 7.03(a).
47. Id. §§ 7.04(a), 7.10(a).
48. Under well established Delaware precedents, the court must accept all well pled al-
legations in the complaint as true for purposes of applying the Aronson "reasonable doubt"
test. See Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 953 (Del. 1992).
49. Section 7.04(a)(2) provides that in response to a statement from disinterested directors
rejecting demand, "the complaint shall also plead with particularity facts that, if true, raise
a significant prospect ... that disinterested directors could not reasonably have determined
that rejection of demand was in the best interests of the corporation." The key term significant
prospect is not defined, and is deliberately not quantified in terms of any specific percentage.
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The operation of the ALI's approach to demand rejection cannot be
understood fully based only on a reading of the black-letter text of section
7.04(a). Read without the Commentary, that language may convey a mis-
leading impression. To illustrate, consider the following case: In a duty of
loyalty case governed by section 7.04(a)(2)(C), the disinterested directors
respond to plaintiff's demand with a conclusory assessment that the action
was without merit or, even if it was potentially meritorious, that it was
unlikely to yield a net recovery to the corporation after deduction of all
costs. At this point, plaintiffs face the following problems: (i) many rea-
sonable justifications exist for not suing, (ii) the plaintiffs are not entitled
to any detailed statement of reasons, and (iii) discovery is not available to
them at this stage. How then can plaintiffs ever prove that the directors
"could not reasonably have determined that rejection of the demand was
in the best interests of the corporation" 50 when the only statement from
the directors provided no justification for their decision?
Unquestionably, the plaintiffs at this stage face an uphill struggle, and
many derivative actions (some potentially meritorious) will be screened out
by section 7.04(a). The basic compromise reached at the ALI's 1992 An-
nual Meeting, however, was to determine the "reasonableness" of the
directors' action (in a fair dealing case) by balancing the legal merit of the
case, as pled with particularity by the plaintiff under section 7.04(a)(1),
against the justifications, if any, raised by the directors in rejecting demand.
Specifically, the Commentary to section 7.04(a)(2) expresses this trade-off
in the following language:
In applying section 7.04(a), a court should balance the strength and
seriousness of the case made by the particularized pleading of the
plaintiff under section 7.04(a)(1) with that made under section
7.04(a)(2). The stronger the plaintiff's claim as tested under section
7.04(a)(1), the less the complaint must allege with particularity to
establish under section 7.04(a)(2) that there is a significant prospect
the directors could not .. reasonably have determined that rejection
of the demand was in the best interests of the corporation under
section 7.02(a)(2)(C). 51
What this balancing test implies is that where an action is strong on its
merits, less must be shown by the plaintiff in response to the board's
rejection of demand in order to raise a "significant prospect" that the
Suffice it to say that the Reporters believe that courts will use this phrase as authority for a
judicial "smell test": Do the pleadings raise serious and specific enough charges to merit
further inquiry, notwithstanding the board's rejection?
50. Principles, supra note *, § 7.04(a)(2)(C).
51. This Commentary and the current text to § 7.04(a) do not appear in the Proposed
Final Draft of the Principles since they are changes made at the May 1992 Annual Meeting.
The revised text and Commentary of § 7.04(a) will appear in the Final Draft of the Principles,
which is forthcoming in 1993.
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rejection was unreasonable (in a duty of fair dealing case). Indeed, the
Commentary states that a reply to demand that is only conclusory or that
"does not state the reasons for the disinterested directors' rejection should
be given only limited weight as against a particularized allegation that
strongly raises a significant prospect of a violation under the standard of
section 7.04(a)(1)."52 Phrasing this point even more simply, the Commen-
tary adds that the "stronger and more serious the showing under section
7.04(a)(1), the more difficult it will be to dismiss the action in the absence
of a statement of equivalently credible reasons for the rejection in the
reply."5 3 In short, although the disinterested directors need not justify
their rejection, it will be the rare corporation that exercises this option
of silence.
At this point, the contrast between the ALI and Delaware approaches
comes into clearer focus. Both use the demand stage as a filtering device
to screen out those actions that should not go forward. Under the Delaware
formula, the focus primarily is on the composition of the board (and, to
a lesser degree, on whether the board's response satisfies the business
judgment rule).5 4 Under the ALI approach, the focus is substantially similar
in a duty of care case, but in those actions not governed by the business
judgment rule (i.e., primarily fair dealing actions), the focus will be on the
relative balance between the action's legal merit and the disinterested
directors' justifications for dismissal. 55 At the same time, however, the
ALI's balancing approach gives real weight to the justifications raised by
disinterested directors. Unlike Zapata, Part VII of the Principles does not
instruct the court to employ its own "independent business judgment,"
nor does it use the seemingly diluted "reasonable doubt" standard of
Aronson-a phrase that invariably carries with it misleading criminal law
associations.
In their accompanying critique of the ALI position, Messrs. Block, Ra-
din, and Maimone offer a revisionist history of section 7.04(a), and argue
that the above-described "balancing approach" was "never mentioned in
any of the written materials circulated ... at the ALI's May 1992 meeting,
and that was first raised publicly by Professor Coffee during the course
of the debate. -"56 They argue that this test undermines the intent of
the motion made by Richard B. Smith at the May 1992 Annual Meeting,
which added section 7.04(a)(2) to the Principles.57 They are correct to focus
on this balancing test as critical, but wrong to think they correctly un-
derstand its history from their considerable distance from the ALI Cor-
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 8-12.
55. Principles, supra note *, §§ 7.04(a), 7.10(a).
56. See Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the American Law
Institute, infra pp. 1473-74.
57. Id. at 1474.
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porate Governance Project. The motion to which they refer inserted sec-
tion 7.04(a)(2), and it was a carefully fashioned compromise that was
drafted jointly by the Reporters, Richard Smith, and W. Loeber Landau
(the latter two being members of the ABA's CORPRO Committee). Far
from opposing the Smith motion, the Reporters joined in it in an effort
to reach a broad consensus on the role for the board at the demand
rejection stage. Not only was the balancing test described above explained
to, and understood by, those who participated in the drafting process prior
to the floor debate, but it was described elaborately to the ALI's mem-
bership at the Annual Meeting as the basis on which the Commentary
would be written. 5 The balancing test was part and parcel of the total
58. As the Reporter for Part VII, the author stated to the membership at the Annual
Meeting in opening the discussion of the pending Smith Motion:
[Wie want to indicate to you two statements that we plan to add to the Comments under
this new 7.04. . . . And this has already been cleared with the sponsors of the motion.
We would say, first, that in considering whether a significant prospect has been pleaded
under 7.04(a) the court may consider the nature and specificity of the reasons provided
by the corporation for rejecting demand, or the fact that no reasons were provided. [An
elaboration followed.] That creates an incentive to give a full statement at the demand
rejection and permits the plaintiff to be able to plead with greater particularity why
those specific reasons given to it were inadequate....
The next statement really involves what I'll call a balancing concept. That is, there
should be some balance between 7.04(a)(1) and 7.04(a)(2). The stronger the showing of
an egregious violation under (a)(1), the more you have pleaded with particularity reasons
that show that the transaction looks like it flunks the standard of Parts IV, V or VI, that
the merits are bad, then the higher should be the required showing and statement by
the corporation under (a)(2) with respect to what its reasons were for rejecting this
demand of this seemingly meritorious case.
In that light we have the following language, which, again, with some possible mod-
ifications, we expect to add to the commentary. It would say, "The more egregious the
violation that is pleaded with particularity under 7.04(a)(1), the more it is likely that the
court would be expected to focus on and consider the reasons provided by the corpo-
ration for rejecting demand." And that's a way-there may be more to that concept than
that single sentence but it is this notion of balancing the showing under (a)(1) with the
showing of demand rejection under (a) (2)....
Almost immediately following my statement, Chief Reporter Eisenberg added:
Secondly, I think that we should say-and this is a variation, perhaps, of what Jack said,
and I think it's been implicit in the debate, on both sides-that the stronger the parti-
cularized showing that there is a significant prospect that a violation occurred, especially
a violation of the duty of fair dealing, the more likely that a reasonable prospect will be
shown that disinterested directors could not reasonably have determined that rejection
is in the best interests of the corporation. I think also we should say that the decision,
although discovery is not available, the decision can take into account the fact that
discovery was not available.
And finally, I believe that all of these points should be exemplified by illustrations.
Now, my plan at least on the commentary is to circulate the proposed commentary
widely, make it available and circulate it for comments, so that people will have a chance
to react to the commentary as they see it, but I'm also making this statement so that
people aren't surprised, or if they are surprised they can say so now, as to what I propose
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compromise, and without it, it is uncertain (and unlikely in my judgment)
that the compromise would have passed. During the year since the May
1992 Annual Meeting, the Commentary to section 7.04(a) has been worked
out in numerous joint drafting sessions with Messrs. Landau and Smith
and, to the best of my understanding after consultation with them, is
viewed by them as appropriately reflecting that compromise. As in all
compromises, both sides gave up something, but there was full disclosure.
SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES
If a complaint survives the section 7.04(a) hurdle, the plaintiff still does
not proceed automatically to discovery and trial. Once past the demand
rejection stage, Part VII's procedures thereafter largely parallel the Del-
aware "special litigation committee" procedure. At most, the ALI's pro-
cedures for the use of a special litigation committee are marginally more
restrictive than those of Delaware. Procedurally, section 7.09 requires only:
(i) the use of a two or more member committee;59 (ii) the assistance of
counsel "capable of exercising independent professional judgment under
the circumstances; ' 60 (iii) an adequate evaluation of the action; and (iv)
the preparation of a report or other written submission setting forth the
determinations of the board or committee in sufficient detail to permit
judicial review. 6' Even material departures from these provisions can be
waived by the court for good reason, 62 and in actual practice it is unlikely
that a Delaware corporation, advised by sophisticated counsel, would de-
viate significantly from any of these standards once it was in the "demand
excused" context.
The key substantive ALI provision at this litigation committee stage is
set forth in section 7.10, which once again provides for a bifurcated stan-
would go into it.
See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, supra p.
1271.
59. Section 7.09(a)(1) provides: "The board or committee should be composed of two or
more persons, no participating member of which was interested [§ 1.23] in the action and
should as a group be capable of objective judgment in the circumstances."
60. See Principles, supra note *, § 7.09 cmt. h, at 717.
61. Section 7.09(a)(3) provides: "The determinations of the board or committee should
be based upon a review and evaluation that was sufficiently informed to satisfy the standards
applicable under § 7.10(a)." Section 7.10(a) then distinguishes actions in which the gravamen
of the claim involves a transaction or conduct that would be reviewed under the business
judgment rule, and an action in which the gravamen of the claim involves transactions or
conduct to which the business judgment rule would not be applicable. In the latter case, the
board or committee must be "adequately informed under the circumstances" and provide
"grounds that the court deems to warrant reliance."
62. Section 7.08 requires substantial compliance with the procedures specified in § 7.09,
unless "any material departures therefrom were justified under the circumstances."
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dard ofjudicial review. Basically, if the gravamen of the action is a violation
of the duty of fair dealing,6 or if the action alleges a "knowing and culpable
violation of law' 64 (or other violation of the duty of care to which the
business judgment rule is not applicable), 65 then the court may dismiss the
action based on the litigation committee's report only "if the court finds,
in light of the applicable standards under Parts IV or V, that the board
or committee was adequately informed under the circumstances and rea-
sonably determined that dismissal was in the best interests of the corpo-
ration, based on grounds that the court deems to warrant reliance. '66 The
last clause-"based on grounds that the court deems to warrant reliance"-
does not require that the court employ its own "independent business
judgment" (as in Zapata), but it does preclude the court from simply de-
ferring to the asserted greater expertise of the board or committee.
In contrast, if the gravamen of the action involves the duty of care or
some other duty that would be reviewed under the business judgment rule,
then a business judgment standard similarly governs the court's review of
the determinations of the board or committee and its justifications for
dismissal of the action. 67 This bifurcated standard of review is basically
similar to that under section 7.04 at the demand rejection stage, but it is
fleshed out with additional detail to reflect the fact that the litigation
committee typically will have made detailed findings and presented well-
briefed arguments favoring its recommendation that the action be dis-
missed.
Although the Part VII procedural rules probably are stricter than the
minimum allowable under Delaware's current law, Part VII's attitude
toward termination of actions raising only ordinary due care litigation
probably is more relaxed than Delaware's. Under Delaware law, once de-
mand is excused, any motion to terminate the action based on a special
committee report is discretionary with the court, which can apply its own
"independent business judgment. ' 68 Yet, under section 7.10, the com-
63. One qualification is necessary here-some "fair dealing" claims are reviewed under a
business judgment standard pursuant to Part V. An example is compensation. See Principles,
supra note *, § 5.03. In such cases, Part VII similarly provides that a business judgment
standard of review applies to the motion of the board or committee requesting dismissal. See
Principles, supra note *, § 7.10(a)(1). The other sections of Part V that reference a business
judgment standard are §§ 5.04, 5.05, 5.06, and 5.08. Also, a business judgment standard
applies under § 6.02 to an action for damages against a director with regard to defensive
actions designed to block an unsolicited tender offer.
64. See Principles, supra note *, § 7.10(a)(2). Not all violations of law necessarily are "know-
ing and culpable." See id. §§ 7.10 cmt. f, 7.19 cmt. f (discussing when legal violations, in-
cluding criminal acts, should be deemed "knowing and culpable").
65. By its usual terms, the business judgment rule also is not applicable in cases where
corporate officials did not inform themselves adequately in order to satisfy the procedural
prerequisites of the rule. See id. § 4.01 (c)(2).
66. Id. § 7.10(a)(2).
67. Id. § 7.10(a)(1).
68. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
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mittee's motion to terminate an ordinary duty of care case is reviewed
explicitly under a business judgment standard, even if the majority of the
entire board was interested.
This does not mean that there are no teeth in the Principles, but it shows
that where the teeth of the Principles chiefly bite is in the area of self-
dealing (and not the duty of care). In particular, section 7.10(b) sets forth
a strong prophylactic rule, but it is carefully limited exclusively to the
context of self-dealing. It provides that, absent special circumstances, the
action may not be dismissed if dismissal would permit a defendant to retain
a "significant improper benefit" and if certain other conditions are pre-
sent.69 This provision will not be triggered frequently (because the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the misappropriation and retention of such
a benefit), but its existence points out the deterrent rationale that underlies
Part VII's approach to self-dealing. Even if the action will not yield a net
financial recovery, it cannot be terminated under section 7.10(b) if to do
so would permit certain defendants to retain significant unjust enrichment.
Although a few Delaware decisions at times have hinted at a public policy
rationale for the derivative action,70 this rationale is explicit in the Principles
(but also limited to self-dealing and knowing violations of law).
POLICY PREMISES: THE POLICY ASSUMPTIONS
UNDERLYING THE AL'S POSITION
The preceding thumbnail sketch of Part VII of the Principles sets the
stage for a closer examination of its underlying rationale. No assessment
of the derivative action, or of any of the competing legal systems for its
regulation, can proceed very far without having to face the following fun-
damental questions.
BOARDS VERSUS COURTS: HOW SHOULD
RESPONSIBILITY BE ALLOCATED?
The most controversial issue surrounding the derivative action involves
the relative competence of the board versus the court. Liberals point to
evidence that boards always reject demand and that special litigation com-
69. Principles, supra note *, § 7.10(b). Essentially, this section is triggered only if the plaintiff
can show that the "significant improper benefit" was obtained either (i) by a controlling
person or a control group, or (ii) as the result of fraud or without advance authorization or
the requisite ratification of such benefit by disinterested directors. Even then a showing of
special harm or injury can justify dismissal if it "convincingly outweighs" any adverse impact
on the public interest from dismissal of the action. Id.
70. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) ("The Court of Chan-
cery should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public policy
in addition to the corporation's best interests.").
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mittees tend to recommend dismissal almost invariably.7' Conservatives
reply that courts do not understand business decision making and fail to
recognize that legitimate reasons frequently exist why even a meritorious
litigation should not be pursued. Both sides have their point, but, so
framed, their arguments pass each other like the proverbial ships in the
night.
More importantly, there is an irony about this debate that has been
overlooked. Those who believe that the board should have the lion's share
of the discretion tend to favor the Delaware law on demand. The problem
with the Delaware approach, however, is that plaintiffs seldom make de-
mand under it (but instead litigate the issue of demand futility). As a result,
courts by default become the only decisionmaker to pass on whether the
action should proceed. In this light, the real impact of the "demand re-
quired/demand excused" distinction is to deny the court any input from
the board, except in those "demand excused" cases where the directors'
credibility seems least likely. In other cases, the court is left to speculate
about what the board might have believed or how it might have responded
to demand.
If one believes that there should be a shared responsibility between the
board and the court (both to better inform the court and to trigger possible
internal corrective responses), then the superiority of the ALI's "universal
demand" rule becomes clear. Still, a deeper reason also explains why a
system is preferable that forces demand rejection to be justified to the
court, even when the board clearly is independent. Although the conven-
tional wisdom seems to assume that the granting of any residual oversight
to the court subtracts from the power in the board, this is a shallow
premise. The dynamics between the outside directors and senior manage-
ment are subtler, and the existence ofjudicial oversight may enhance the
board's leverage. The knowledge that one is being watched and that one
mustjustify one's actions improves the behavior of most individuals. Above
all, the need to explain one's justifications to the court gives disinterested
directors a basis for refusing to accept reasons that merely are pretextual
or cosmetic. Absent judicial oversight, if no response is required of the
outside directors in order to secure dismissal of the action, passivity may
sometimes be the path of least resistance. But once it is understood that
the directors' position must be expressed to the plaintiffs and ultimately
71. Duke Law ProfessorJames Cox surveyed the field in 1982 and found only one instance
in which the special litigation committee had not concluded that the suit should be dismissed.
See James Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of
Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 963 (1982). More recently, his colleague at
Duke, Professor Deborah DeMott, found only one recent case in her treatise where the
committee recommended suit against any corporate official. See DEBORAH DEMOTr, STAKE-
HOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAw AND PRACTIc E 98 (1991 Supp.). Undoubtedly, there are
other instances that diligent research could uncover, but it would prove little. The tendency
of the process is clear.
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defended in court, passive acquiescence becomes less attractive. Internally,
disinterested directors can justify their resistance to senior management
not in terms of their personal objections or misgivings, but in terms of
the legal risks or public appearances ("It just won't wash in court, Joe.").
In short, the existence of judicial review should strengthen the hand of
outside directors and enhance internal systems of accountability.
None of the foregoing arguments depend upon any theory of structural
bias. That theory, which asserts that directors share a natural empathy and
sense of collegiality that ensures they will band together to protect a col-
league who has been sued, 72 certainly is plausible, but it is not the foun-
dation underlying Part VII of the Principles. Although the evidence to date
on the actual decisions of special litigation committees does little to dispel
the fears of those who believe social and psychological pressures induce
the board to protect senior managers,7 3 Part VII recognizes that there are
legitimate and important reasons why even meritorious actions should not
go forward. If disinterested directors make a reasonable case for dismissal,
then Part VII provides, both in section 7.04 and section 7.10, that the
action must be terminated even in the self-dealing context.
WHY SHOULD THE DUTY OF LOYALTY BE TREATED
DIFFERENTLY FROM THE DUTY OF CARE?
Nothing is more evident about the structure of Part VII than that it
draws a sharp distinction between the duty of loyalty (or "fair dealing" in
its parlance) and the duty of care. Not only do section 7.04 and section
7.10 employ a "reasonableness" standard for termination of duty of fair
dealing claims, but section 7.19 authorizes charter provisions placing a
low ceiling on the director's or officer's financial liability to the corporation
for most duty of care violations.74 But why should the law treat claims
raising the duty of care so dissimilarly from claims raising the duty of fair
dealing? The standard academic answer has been that judicial competence
is lesser in the former case, and thus the prospect of judicial error is
greater in cases where a conflict of interest is absent. 75 Clearly, when a
business decision proves erroneous, multiple explanations for that failure
are possible. It could be that the decisionmaker was negligent, but, con-
versely, the truth may be that a risk that was accepted knowingly and
72. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 5; see also Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729
F.2d. 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984).
73. See supra note 71.
74. See Principles, supra note *, § 7.19 (authorizing charter provision placing ceiling on
corporate official's liability for certain due care violations equal to one year's compensation
from the corporation).
75. Harold Demsetz, A Commentary on Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 352 (1986); Kenneth Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983).
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prudently simply came to an unfortunate fruition. Or, it could be that a
new and unforeseeable risk arose and matured after the time the business
decision was irrevocably made. Because business decision making involves
unavoidable trade-offs between risk and return, some prudent decisions
will prove disastrous. Examining these decisions with the 20/20 vision of
judicial hindsight, courts may be unable to distinguish accurately lack of
care from statistical bad luck. If this risk of judicial error is considerable,
then to the extent the derivative action is relied upon to enforce the duty
of care, it may deter risk taking by management and service on the board,
rather than negligence.
In contrast, within the context of the duty of loyalty, the possibility of
non-culpable error is much smaller. When a corporate fiduciary fails to
disclose a conflict of interest to disinterested directors, the chances are
much greater that the fiduciary did so opportunistically, not innocently.
Self-dealing seldom is unavoidable in the same manner as business risk.
With the exception of compensation decisions (which the ALI in fact sub-
jects to a business judgment review),76 there usually is another party with
whom the corporation could have transacted on similar terms. Conflicts
of interest are something that courts have a long history of policing, and,
unlike the duty of care, they do not require courts to evaluate risk/return
trade-offs with which they are uncomfortable and inexperienced.
Although the differing competence of courts in handling duty of care
versus duty of loyalty actions represents the conventional justification for
focusing the derivative action on duty of loyalty claims, another justifi-
cation may be even more important. Within the corporate context, the
duty of care is at least partially self-policing. Thus, less need exists for
legal institutions to generate additional deterrence. To the extent that both
the corporation and its managers operate in reasonably competitive fi-
nancial, product, and labor markets, the cost of negligent errors will be
borne, at least partially, by those who commit them. Any incentive to slack
is at best marginal. Because there is little incentive to commit negligent
errors (and because real stupidity tends to reveal itself, thereby increasing
the probability of detection), the usual logic of the deterrence theory,
which focuses on the magnitude of the gain and the difficulty of detection,
does not require substantial penalties for negligence.
In the case of duty of loyalty violations, however, the likelihood of de-
tection is lower, and the magnitude of the expected gain is higher. Not
only can self-dealing be concealed, but it tends to become self-perpetu-
ating. Once a manager has engaged in one unfair self-dealing transaction,
there is less social or moral inhibition to dissuade that manager from
engaging in similar transactions. In addition, other managers may detect
the self-dealing behavior and emulate it. In short, unlike simple incom-
petence, self-dealing can be contagious and can corrupt the organizational
76. Compare Principles, supra note *, § 5.03 with id. § 7.10(a)(1).
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culture. Given this greater likelihood that undetected self-dealing will lead
to recidivism, the deterrent gains from a derivative action contesting duty
of loyalty violations seem greater.
DETERRENCE VERSUS COMPENSATION
In principle, either a deterrent or a compensatory rationale could un-
derlie the derivative action. 7" If compensation is to be the fundamental
justification of the action, then a simple decision rule exists for when the
suit should be allowed to proceed: Does the expected recovery exceed the
expected litigation costs that the corporation will bear (including plaintiff's
attorney fees)? Some decisions have approached adopting such a rule (at
least with regard to judicial review of special litigation committee re-
ports),78 but the Principles do not. Instead, section 7.10(b) announces a
special (but limited) rule that clearly rests on a deterrent rationale: Absent
special circumstances, the action may not be terminated if "dismissal would
permit a defendant ... to retain a significant improper benefit" where in
substance the defendants either controlled the corporation or obtained
the benefit through fraud or without advance authorization. 79
The case for a deterrent rationale rests on an unknown and probably
unknowable variable: the gains to shareholders resulting from future mis-
conduct that is deterred. Although these gains cannot be quantified re-
liably, it is easy to understate them. In part, this is because a successful
derivative action is likely to produce a positive externality: it will deter
misconduct at other corporations. As a result, even if the deterrent benefits
to the corporation in whose name the action is brought do not exceed the
corporation's direct and indirect litigation costs, its shareholders still may
benefit. Because shareholders generally do not own stock in a single com-
pany, but hold diversified portfolios, they benefit if a derivative action
deters potential defendants who are situated similarly at other companies,
even if it involves a net loss to the corporation in whose name the action
is brought.80
Why would there be such a benefit? The logic is the same as in the case
of criminal enforcement. Both the derivative action and criminal enforce-
ment depend on an external enforcer-the public prosecutor or the plain-
77. Although many decisions assume a compensatory rationale, others expressly articulated
a deterrent rationale. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (noting
that function of derivative action "unlike an ordinary tort or contract case, is not merely to
compensate plaintiffs for wrongs committed by the defendant but ... 'to prevent them, by
removing from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt dealing for their own benefit.' ")
(citation omitted).
78. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982) (balancing expected value of
recovery against legal costs of continuing suit), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
79. Principles, supra note *, § 7.10(b).
80. See id. pt. VII Introductory Note.
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tiff's lawyer operating as a private bounty hunter.8' When a local U.S.
Attorney apprehends and convicts a corporate official for some violation
of the federal securities laws, this conviction presumably deters not only
other individuals at the same corporation, but also other officials at other
corporations. Indeed, in the case of profit-motivated plaintiffs' lawyers,
one successful action may encourage them to search for other violations
elsewhere in order to efficiently use their new expertise. The real difference
between these two enforcement mechanisms is that the criminal law can
threaten incarcerative sanctions, while a derivative action can employ only
the threats of financial penalties, loss of reputational capital, and social
stigma. These latter costs, particularly stigmatization, are real, and those
subject to them understand that the plaintiff's lawyer who successfully
prosecuted a derivative action at Corporation X will search for other op-
portunities to employ the same legal theory at other corporations. 82 Hence,
one successful derivative action implies that others are likely to follow as
an entrepreneurial plaintiffs' bar searches for similar profitable litigation
opportunities.
To describe the operation of derivative litigation in this fashion is not
to argue that the incentives held out to the plaintiff's lawyer today are
appropriate or efficient. 83 But the real question is how to better focus the
deterrent threat of such private enforcement. As already noted, Part VII
does not focus simply on the net financial recovery to the corporation.
8 4
Indeed, Part VII generally precludes dismissal when a "significant im-
81. Many are offended by the idea of "entrepreneurial" lawyers who are not truly con-
strained by clients who hire them. The Principles seek neither to idealize the problems inherent
in such a relationship nor to ignore the reality that the shareholder client's role is minimal
in the derivative action. Its real concern is with the vulnerability of a system that depends
on private enforcers to collusive settlements that benefit the enforcers more than the class.
See id. § 7.17.
82. Several subsidiary reasons can be given for this contention that entrepreneurial lawyers
will follow a success at one corporation by seeking to pursue similar cases elsewhere. First,
specialization is efficient, and the plaintiffs' bar tends to be extremely specialized (with some
lawyers specializing in areas as narrow as § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 17 U.S.C. § 16(b)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)). Second, by investing substantial time and expense in one large
action, the plaintiff's lawyer will typically gain human capital-that is, special expertise that
it is in the lawyer's interest to exploit by pursuing similar cases at other corporations. In
fact, the lawyer may be able to use the same research and pleadings virtually over again when
a similar action is pursued. Third, the lawyer's success also may make it easier for him or
her to finance other contingent fee actions raising similar claims and to gain control of (or
at least an effective voice in) the plaintiff's team that will organize the new case.
83. Indeed, few have been as outspoken as this author about the existence of perverse
incentives in the legal rules pertaining to fee awards and derivative litigation. See generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiffs Attorney As Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 5 (1985).
84. Instead, § 7.17 focuses on the "value of the relief (including non-pecuniary relief)
obtained by the plaintiff for the corporation" in measuring the plaintiff's attorney's fee award.
See Principles, supra note *, § 7.17.
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proper benefit" has been retaineda 5 More significantly, it shifts both the
corporation's own legal costs and expenses and those of the plaintiff's
lawyer to the defendant in the case of knowing violations of the duty of
fair dealing. 6 This has the significance of raising both the net financial
recovery to the corporation and the expected penalty to the wrongdoers . 7
In this light, dismissal of the action cannot be justified as easily under Part
VII on the usual rationale that the litigation expenses to the corporation
will exceed the likely recovery.
DOCTRINAL CONSISTENCY: WHERE DOES THE ALl
POSITION COME FROM?
As a historical proposition, no generalization about American corporate
law is safer or sounder than that the fiduciary duty of loyalty has long
been subject to judicial oversight. In a well known article, Harold Marsh
traced the evolution of the duty over the last century."' Starting from a
time when self-dealing transactions were always voidable at the election
of the corporation, he followed the doctrinal evolution of the duty until
the prevailing rule became that courts would invalidate only unfair trans-
actions between the fiduciary and the corporation. Beginning in the 1950s
with the adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act, a number of
states enacted "sanitizing" statutes, which established procedures for the
approval of "interested director" transactions. In general, courts and com-
mentators have read these statutes, not as eliminating the issue of fairness,
but as shifting the burden on the plaintiff to prove unfairness.8 9 What has
not changed, at least in most jurisdictions, is the idea that a court still can
85. Id. § 7.10(b).
86. Id. § 7.18(d).
87. In effect, this is a fee shifting standard for duty of loyalty violations that protects the
corporation's recovery from depletion as a result of either corporate legal fees or a judicial
award of plaintiff's attorney's fees. The doctrinal rationale for this position is the familiar
tort law idea that "danger invites rescue." Here, the premise is that the fiduciary who know-
ingly overreaches the corporation should anticipate that such conduct is likely to necessitate
shareholder litigation that is costly to the corporation. Therefore, the fiduciary should hold
the corporation harmless from these foreseeable expenses caused by the fiduciary's knowing
misconduct.
88. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22
Bus. LAw. 35 (1966).
89. See Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Trans-
actions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201 (1977); Note,
The Status of Fairness Under Section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1156 (1976).
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review the fairness of a self-dealing transaction. 90 Thus, the common law's
baseline is that fairness remains relevant, even if a transaction is approved
after full disclosure by disinterested directors.
This was the position adopted by the ALI in Part V (Duty of Fair Dealing)
of the Principles. Under section 5.02, the effect of full disclosure by the
fiduciary to disinterested directors is to shift the burden of proof to the
plaintiff to prove that the directors could not "reasonably have concluded
that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time it was entered
into." 9' Within the ALI, this test was never controversial, because few
members argued that the business judgment rule should apply to a self-
dealing transaction.
Given this position in Part V, Part VII comes into better focus as simply
an attempt to maintain consistency between the substantive right and the
procedural remedy. If Part V provides that full disclosure and disinterested
approval do not alone immunize a self-dealing transaction (if its terms are
outside the range that the board reasonably could have concluded were
fair to the corporation), then Part VII could not provide for a business
judgment standard of review of the demand rejection decision without
overriding Part V.
How then does one explain Delaware's position? There are two alter-
native answers to this question. First, at least formally, Delaware does not
follow the prevailing rule that a court may examine the substantive fairness
of a self-dealing transaction even though full disclosure was made and
disinterested board approval was received. Rather, Delaware case law
seems to say that the business judgment rule applies to such a transaction.92
Thus, there is no inconsistency for Delaware to employ a demand rule
that precludes suit whenever a majority of the board is disinterested be-
cause it already adopted a business judgment rule approach with respect
to the underlying transaction. Yet, to adopt the Delaware demand rule in
jurisdictions that wish to preserve judicial oversight of self-dealing would
not be a neutral change; rather, it would distort and quietly overrule the
substantive law applying to the underlying transaction by adopting an
inconsistent procedural rule.
90. For decisions adopting the burden-shifting approach (or variations thereof), see Re-
millard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 73-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Scott
v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 56-57 (D.N.J. 1974); Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733,
740-41 (7th Cir. 1979); Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Iowa 1974). For
recent cases recognizing that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant in a duty of loyalty
case, see Cookies Food Prods. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Iowa
1988); Warren v. Century Bankcorp., 741 P.2d 846, 849-50 (Okla. 1987).
91. Principles, supra note *, § 5.02(a)(2)(B), (C). Not only is the burden shifted to the
plaintiff to prove unfairness, but § 5.02 effectively definesfainess in terms of a range of fair
value, rather than in terms of the highest valuation standard. Section 5.02 does not use
phrases such as "entire fairness," "intrinsic fairness," or "inherent fairness" as has the
traditional case law, because these suggest a single valuation standard.
92. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (dicta).
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Second, notwithstanding the formal logic of Delaware's position, there
are suggestions in recent decisions in the Delaware Court of Chancery
that the second prong of its Aronson test for demand futility applies largely
(and possibly only) in self-dealing cases. 93 If the substantive terms of the
transaction appear unreasonable, a Delaware court can reason backwards
from this fact to conclude that the process leading to its adoption was
defective, and hence that a reasonable doubt exists that the challenged
transaction qualifies for the protection of the business judgment rule.
Although the court may seldom exercise this discretion, when it does,
Aronson would excuse demand and permit the action to proceed to the
Zapata stage where the court has independent discretion. 94 In short, even
in Delaware, substantive judicial review of self-dealing transactions some-
times may survive. In this light, the ALI approach only may make overt
what was covert. But this is the traditional goal of the ALI-to make the
law clearer, more candid, and less recondite.
THE NEW MYTHS OF DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
To this point, this Article has explained the premises underlying Part
VII. But the critics of Part VII have raised policy arguments that also need
to be considered, some of which broadly challenge the very need for a
litigation remedy. This section will briefly examine three such arguments.
ARGUMENT NUMBER ONE: THE LAW ON DERIVATIVE
ACTIONS IS WELL SETTLED AND THE DELAWARE
RULES ARE THE COMMON LAW
In their Article, Messrs. Block, Radin, and Maimone argue that the
common law on derivative actions is uniform nationally; everyone, they
claim, has followed Delaware (except the ALI). 9 5 Without doubt, Delaware
corporation law has long been followed-sometimes almost reflexively-
by other American jurisdictions. This deference reflects (i) the unques-
tioned expertise of the Delaware judiciary; (ii) the "first mover" advantage
that Delaware enjoys by virtue of the sheer volume of corporate litigation
93. In Andreae v. Andreae, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,571 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5,
1992), the Delaware Court of Chancery found that, although the complaint failed to satisfy
the first prong of the Aronson demand futility test, the second prong was satisfied (and demand
thus was excused) where the self-dealing transaction allegedly was approved at less than the
best obtainable price and without the directors adequately informing themselves. See also
Avacus Partners L.P. v. Brian, 1990 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,232 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24,
1990) (where corporation paid over 10 times fair market value for stock and 100 times
recently established purchase price of another corporation, waste sufficiently was alleged to
withstand motion to dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1).
94. See supra text accompanying note 68.
95. See Block, supra note 56, at 1443-44. New York and Delaware, of course, glaringly
disagree on the standards relating to the termination of derivative suits. See supra notes 11-
12.
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in its courts; and (iii) the absence of other authoritative sources to which
to look. Nonetheless, it is an egregious overstatement to characterize the
law on demand or on special litigation committees as largely resolved.
96
To the contrary, outside of Delaware, most of the cases dealing with de-
rivative litigation in recent years were federal decisions. 97 These cases are
at best predictions of what the highest state court in a jurisdiction would
say, and to date these predictions often have proved wrong or at least
suspect.98 In truth, relatively few of the nation's highest state courts (out-
side of Delaware and New York) have issued an authoritative modern
opinion on derivative litigation.99 Of these, decisions in Iowa,100 Massa-
96. Block, supra note 56, pp. 1443-44.
97. In the following states, there appears to be no clear decision by the highest state court
on the status of special litigation committees, but federal courts hearing derivative actions
based on diversity jurisdiction have reached decisions construing the authority of such a
committee. California: Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 770-72 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Colorado: Bach v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 810 F.2d 509, 510-12
(5th Cir. 1987); Connecticut: Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Georgia: Peller v. Southern Co., 707 F. Supp. 525, 527-28 (N.D. Ga.
1988), aff'd, 911 F.2d 1532 (11 th Cir. 1990); Illinois: Weiland v. Illinois Power Co. [1990-
1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,747, at 98,581 (C.D. 11. 1990); Maryland:
Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. 1493, 1488-1500 (D. Md. 1985); Michigan: Genzer v.
Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 686-87 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Ohio: In re General Tire & Rubber
Co. Sec. Litg., 726 F.2d 1075, 1082-83 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Schreiber v. Gencorp.,
Inc., 469 U.S. 858 (1984); Virginia: Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795,
798-800 (E.D. Va. 1982). Among these jurisdictions, there is now legislation in Georgia and
Virginia addressing the power of independent directors to terminate derivative litigation. See
Ga. CODE ANN. § 14-2-744 (Michie 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672(D) (Michie 1993).
98. For example, in Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980), the Eighth Circuit predicted that Delaware would apply a
business judgment standard to a special litigation committee's motion to dismiss, thus failing
to anticipate Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), which reached a
similar result, seems in tension with later California cases that refused to terminate derivative
litigation. See, e.g., Will v. Engebretson & Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The Fifth Circuit's decision
in Bach v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 810 F.2d 509, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1987), which favored
a business judgment standard, also may not reflect the eventual attitude of Colorado state
courts in light of the stricter approach taken toward such committees in Greenfield v. Ham-
ilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
99. Except for the decisions listed in the next three footnotes, the only other decisions
of importance by state appellate courts are Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629,
632 (Ala. 1981), Black v. NuAire, Inc. 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), and Lewis
v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Black has since been overruled by a statutory
amendment of the Minnesota law.
100. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983). In their
article, Messrs. Block, Radin, and Maimone dispute my citation of Miller (which rejects the
use of special litigation committees appointed by the defendants). They point out that the
Principles stop well short of Miller's stronger prophylactic rule. See Block, supra note 56, at
1445-46 n. 11. This is correct, but it hardly negates my statement that the Iowa Supreme
Court clearly rejected the Delaware position. Moreover, the fact that the ALI takes a more
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chusetts, °'0 and North Carolina'0 have indicated a preference for the ALI's
approach-or for even stronger rules.
Nonetheless, Messrs. Block, Radin, and Maimone argue that virtually all
decisions follow Delaware and provide a lengthy list of string citations.10 3
Most of the cases they cite are federal decisions, but the state decisions
they rely on truly are worth the reader's attention because they almost
uniformly reject a simple business judgment rule approach. For example,
they cite Gaillard v. Natomas Co.'0 4 for the proposition that California
follows the business judgment rule with regard to derivative litigation.'0 5
In fact, the Gaillard decision, which involved golden parachutes issued on
the eve of a takeover, held that the business judgment rule did "not apply
to a judicial review of the conduct of the insider directors."'0 6 Although
it did find the business judgment rule potentially applicable to the outside
directors, the California Court of Appeal still found sufficient issues of
triable fact as to whether the outside directors engaged in a proper exercise
of business judgment as to require a reversal of the summary judgment
granted for the defendants.'0 7 Gaillard is not an aberration, because later
California appellate decisions were even more skeptical of the board's
performance in derivative litigation and have not adopted a traditional
business judgment analysis.' 08 As a practical matter, summary judgment is
probably unavailable today in a derivative action filed in a California state
court.'0 9 In any event, to read these decisions as reflecting the same at-
conservative position than Iowa hardly shows either that the ALI position is radical or that
the common law is uniform.
101. Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 56-59 (Mass. 1990) (requiring that committee reach
a "reasonable and principled decision").
102. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 325-28 (N.C. 1987). Alford is emphatic that there
must be substantive judicial review of the motion to dismiss a derivative action in all cases,
not just in the "demand excused" context. Id. at 327.
103. See Block, supra note 56, at 1447-48. Their list of cases again shows the danger of
string citations. In many of these decisions, the court simply makes a perfunctory bow to
the business judgment rule and then explains why it does not apply to the case before it.
104. 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
105. Block, supra note 56, at 1447-48 n.15.
106. Gaillard, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
107. Id. at 717.
108. See Will v. Engebretson & Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
structural bias a significant danger but assuming that a court may not engage in substantive
review); see also Country Nat'l Bank v. Mayer, 788 F. Supp. 1136, 1144 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
("[I]f the board refuses in good faith and in the reasonable exercise of its business judgment
to commence the action, the shareholder may not institute the action.") (emphasis added).
This emphasis on "reasonable exercise" hardly is consistent with the standard formulation
of the business judgment rule.
109. In Will, a California intermediate appellate court found that the board cannot make
a motion for summary judgment based on the committee's report when the plaintiff disputes
factual conclusions or determinations in the report. Will, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75. As a
practical matter, this leaves no procedural vehicle by which the special litigation committee's
report can terminate the case short of a trial on the merits.
Derivative Litigation (Part VII): Coffee 1435
titudes and analytic framework as Delaware's is to reveal an extreme degree
of myopia.
Other decisions relied upon by Messrs. Block, Radin, and Maimone are
equally wide of the mark.110 Strangest of all is their citation of Lewis v.
Boyd,"' which expressly rejects a "demand required/demand excused"
analysis." 2 Lewis is in fact the latest of several recent decisions to insist on
a judicial power to review substantively the rationale for any attempt by
the corporation to terminate a derivative action." 3 This is the core of the
ALI position and exactly the kind of inquiry to which The Business Round-
table objects. In light of these decisions, the claim made by Messrs. Block,
Radin, and Maimone that the law outside of Delaware does not differ
materially from the law within Delaware only can be described as bizarre.
My point is not that these recent cases are in all respects ideally artic-
ulated; indeed, some already go well beyond the ALI's more carefully
measured standards. In other jurisdictions (such as California), it is simply
uncertain when and if a derivative action can be terminated based on the
board's motion. Traditionally, it is when the law is unsettled that courts
most frequently look to ALI Restatements. Given this backdrop of un-
certain legal standards and the general lack of familiarity of most state
courts with derivative litigation, the advantage of the Principles is that they
provide a detailed roadmap-that is, an integrated set of rules that instructs
the court on how to proceed from demand to the final resolution of the
110. Messrs. Block, Radin, and Maimone also cite Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes
Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988); Warren v. Century Bankcorp., 741
P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988); Lewis v. Boyd,
838 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); see Block, supra note 56, at 1447 n.14. Cookies Food
contains a strong statement that the business judgment rule governs only where a director
is shown not to have a self interest in the transaction at issue. Cookies Food, 430 N.W.2d at
453. Warren actually holds that an "intrinsic fairness" test must be applied, and that de-
fendants had the burden of proof. Warren, 741 P.2d at 849-50 n. 11. Rosenthal not only cites
the Principles, but carefully limits the application of the business judgment rule. Rosenthal,
543 A.2d at 353-54. Moreover, the case was not even a derivative action.
111. 838 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
112. d. at 224. ("We agree with the Supreme Court of North Carolina that a special
litigation committee's recommendation should be reviewed using a single standard and that
the depth of review should not depend upon whether or not the shareholder made a demand
prior to filing suit.").
113. Lewis expressly cites Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990), and Alford v. Shaw,
358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987), and then states:
The review should extend to the rationale of the committee's decision. The court
should critically evaluate the committee's findings and recommendations to determine
whether they were made in good faith, whether they are supported by the record of the
investigation, and whether they are consistent with the corporation's best interests as
articulated in the special committee's report.
Lewis, 838 S.W.2d at 224. This is in substance probably stronger than the ALl position. All
three cases, along with Will v. Engrebretson & Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989),
reveal a clear skepticism of pro forma justifications for dismissal.
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action. In the many jurisdictions where the law on derivative actions ap-
pears uncertain, this attraction should not be underestimated.
ARGUMENT NUMBER TWO: DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
PRODUCE LITTLE BENEFIT AND THUS DO NOT
JUSTIFY THEIR COSTS
This claim rests on various types of empirical studies. Some of these
studies find shareholder litigation to have little effect on share prices.' 4
The plausibility of this form of evidence depends on one's view of stock
market efficiency. Even a proponent of the semi-strong version of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis can doubt the market's ability to mea-
sure the deterrent value of the derivative action in chilling future mis-
conduct." 5
A second type of study examined the actual outcome of derivative ac-
tions." 6 Professor Roberta Romano's careful research paints a picture not
unlike earlier studies. Most actions settle (sixty-six percent in her sample),
but only about half these actions resulted in any monetary recovery." 7
The average recovery in those actions having a monetary settlement was
$6 million." 8 Plaintiffs' lawyers received an average fee award of $1.45
million (or twenty-four percent of the average settlement fund) in cases
involving monetary settlements." 9 Because the financial costs of the de-
fense were probably higher and were passed on to the corporation indi-
rectly (through either indemnification or insurance), the direct financial
benefit to the corporation of these actions appears very modest and often
may be negative.
What does this evidence really prove? First, the same critique could be
made of the criminal law-the fines imposed by a criminal court often may
fall below the state's cost of prosecution. Nonetheless, criminal prosecu-
tions continue, either because society believes in general deterrence or
because it enjoys retribution. Similarly, the value of the derivative action
114. See, e.g., Wallace N. Davidson et al., The Impact of Directors' and Officers' Liability Suits
on Firm Value, 56 J. RIsK & INS. 128 (1989); Daniel Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of
Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
71 CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1986).
115. Such a conclusion is in fact reached in a working paper authored by Harvard Law
Professors Reinier Kraakman and Steven Shavell. See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are
Shareholder Suits In Shareholder Interests? (Feb. 1993) (on file with author). They conclude that
existing legal rules may sometimes "create too weak an inducement to sue because they fail
to reflect the deterrent benefits of a decision to bring suit." In other cases, they conclude
the incentive may be too strong because the existing rules fail to consider implicit legal costs.
116. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 56 (1991).
117. Id. at 60-63.
118. Id. at 61.
119. The fee award fell to $287,000 in cases settled based on nonmonetary relief. Id. at
63, 70.
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arguably lies in its deterrent capacity, which such studies do not measure.
Although the deterrent threat of the derivative action may be undercut
to some degree by liability insurance, most directors' and officers' liability
policies do not cover repayment of an improper benefit. In addition, there
also are non-monetary sanctions, such as loss of reputation and social
stigma. These intangibles are even harder to estimate, yet only a fool
ignores them.
Second, the real problem with any study finding a negligible benefit is
that it cannot measure the deterrent or compensatory capacity of the
derivative action in the abstract, but only under a specific set of legal rules.
Recent studies, which have focused on publicly listed companies, are thus
principally measuring the effectiveness of Delaware law, because Delaware
is the corporate home for nearly half of such companies. That these studies
find only negligible benefits and substantial costs hardly is reassuring about
Delaware's legal rules for the derivative action. By the same token, such
studies prove little about alternative legal regimes, including the ALI's
proposals.
The bottom line then is that any claim that the empirical data prove the
derivative action useless is circular. The outcome of derivative actions is
determined largely by the incentives that the law holds out to private
enforcers. If the operative legal rules tell the plaintiff's lawyer that there
is a high probability of dismissal, regardless of the action's merit, the
predictable result of such rules will be small settlements. All this proves
is the old truism that the parties "bargained in the shadow of the law."
Ultimately, empirical research cannot prove that the derivative action can-
not work. All that empirical studies can measure (and only incompletely)
is the impact of existing legal rules. The more one credits this new research,
the more one is led to the conclusion that the existing legal rules for the
derivative action need to be redesigned-and that is what, to a modest
degree, the ALI has sought to accomplish.
Another type of empirical research about contemporary litigation fur-
ther suggests the need for caution in assessments about the potential utility
of the derivative action. These studies find very high rates of plaintiff
success in securities class actions. In a study of securities class actions
involving initial public offerings, Stanford Professor Janet Cooper Alex-
ander found that such actions tend to settle at a fixed percentage of the
damages sought regardless of their legal merit.1 20 Ironically, this evidence
is just the other side of the same coin from the evidence that derivative
actions yield modest recoveries.1 2 1 Yet, securities class actions are not fun-
120. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
121. The Romano study found that in cases involving a monetary settlement, derivative
actions yielded an average cash recovery ($6 million) that was roughly half that for shareholder
class actions ($11 million). Romano, supra note 116, at 61.
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damentally different from derivative actions. Indeed, the same plaintiffs'
lawyers bring them against the same defendants often based on the same
transactions. That these lawyers succeed (perhaps too well) in securities
class actions and not well at all in derivative actions is ultimately proof of
a very simple truth: legal rules count. Design a system in which plaintiffs
cannot often win and you will predictably observe low average recoveries;
design one in which plaintiffs seemingly seldom lose and you will observe
the reverse. There has to be a happy medium between these extremes.
ARGUMENT NUMBER THREE: THE ALI'S RULES ONLY
WILL SERVE TO DRIVE UP THE SETTLEMENT VALUE
OF ALL DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
This claim that the effect of any reform ultimately will be only to drive
up the settlement value of all actions, meritorious and non-meritorious
alike, rests on the view that the merits do not matter. Admittedly, some
evidence from the context of securities class actions seemed to support
such a claim. A well-known study of securities class actions that were
brought in the wake of initial public offerings by computer related com-
panies seemed to show that all these cases settled at roughly the same
percentage of their investors' trading losses.'
22 But this study was based
on a small sample of twenty cases in a special context (initial public of-
ferings) where the law strongly favored the plaintiff. More recent research
on securities class actions involving larger and randomly selected samples
found wide variation in settlements as a percentage of the investors' trading
losses. 123 The most logical inference to be drawn from such data is that
the merits do matter. Strong cases settle at a higher percentage of the
stakes involved than do weak cases.
Even so, the claim will be made by some that Part VII gives enhanced
settlement value to weak claims. But this is demonstrably false. Under Part
VII, it is probably as easy or easier to dismiss a duty of care claim than
under Delaware law. For example, in cases where Delaware would excuse
demand and, under Zapata, permit the court to exercise its "independent
business judgment," Part VII still applies a business judgment standard
to duty of care cases not involving knowing and culpable illegality.
2 4 Only
in cases not covered by the business judgment rule (chiefly, duty of fair
dealing cases) does Part VII express a more liberal attitude. But even in
this more sensitive context, the plaintiff must make demand on the board,
and the plaintiff can survive demand rejection only if the plaintiff has pled
122. Alexander, supra note 120, at 517-19.
123. See VINCENT O'BRIEN & RICHARD HODGES, A STUDY OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES
FRAUD CASES (1991); FREDERICK DUNBAR, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS SUITS
(NERA 1992). Both these surveys involve samples of several hundred cases that were settled
at various times between 1988 and 1992.
124. See Principles, supra note *, § 7.10(a)(1).
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with particularity facts that raise a "significant prospect" that (i) there was
a breach of duty, and (ii) the disinterested directors reasonably could not
have rejected plaintiff's demand. This is a significant hurdle, and frivolous
cases will not survive it.
More importantly, Part VII cannot be exploited in ways that exacerbate
the litigation cost differential that sometimes allows weak cases to justify
a settlement and fee award. Part VII does not require expensive or time-
consuming studies by the board or a litigation committee simply because
a plaintiff filed an action. Demand rejection need not be accompanied in
a weak case by any explanation of reasons, and even in a stronger case,
the directors need only show a reasonable basis for their rejection of
demand. Thus, securing dismissal is not costly for the corporation, unless
special circumstances are present. It is only when the plaintiff has pled
facts that in effect raise the suspicious odor of fraud or fiduciary abuse
that the defendants will have any real need to defend themselves. And
only when the disinterested directors' rejection of demand has been in-
sufficiently explained to satisfy the court in relation to the particularized
facts in the complaint, will there be any need to proceed to the full scale
litigation committee procedure exemplified by the Zapata decision.
12
5
The truth is that Part VII may increase the settlement value of a mer-
itorious duty of fair dealing action when the disinterested directors cannot
supply a persuasive justification for demand rejection. Otherwise, Part VII
does nothing to aid the plaintiff who pleads only conclusory facts or whose
action is otherwise non-meritorious. The Reporters' premise is that courts
can recognize and distinguish such cases reasonably well, and Part VII
insists that conclusory or non-meritorious pleadings be dismissed at the
outset. Thus, the only colorable charge directed at Part VII is that it
increases the settlement value of meritorious cases. And that is as it should
be.
CONCLUSION
Far from a radical or bold new reform package, Part VII basically keeps
alive the flickering possibility of judicial oversight of fiduciary duties in
the corporate context. Its core idea can be best expressed in the negative.
In substance, opponents of the Principles have argued that a "lawsuit is
just another corporate asset-no more, no less." It is not. At least when
duty of loyalty issues involving senior executives are at stake, the derivative
action is a mechanism of corporate accountability. Admittedly, it is an
imperfect and flawed mechanism, but so are most others (including share-
holder voting and the tender offer), and such a skeptical assessment only
suggests the need for reform, not abolition.
125. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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Part VII is an attempt to preserve this mechanism of accountability and
to address some of its flaws. In truth, it is far from an unqualified success
at either goal. Although Part VII recognizes that the real benefit of the
derivative action is more likely to lie in the deterrence it generates than
the financial recovery it yields, it by no means seeks to maximize deter-
rence. Only a system that restricted insurance or invoked punitive damages
for knowing breaches of the duty of loyalty conceivably could deter in
terms of the traditional logic of deterrence.' 26 Part VII stops well short
of such an attempt. Still, some deterrence is better than no deterrence at
all, particularly in a world where other social and cultural forces also play
a significant restraining role.
In its attempts to reform the misincentives associated with the derivative
action, Part VII is probably less successful. The evidence is clearcut that
derivative actions frequently result in settlements that are of little benefit
to shareholders, but are very lucrative for plaintiffs' lawyers.' 27 Defense
lawyers are eager to point out this failing, but not to reform the settlement
process. Yet, because it takes two to tango, collusive settlements are not
the responsibility of plaintiffs' lawyers alone. Given that the vast majority
of derivative actions are settled,128 settlement is clearly the critical stage
at which reforms seem necessary. Part VII's provisions regarding settle-
ments are, however, less than bold, and this may reflect the legal profes-
sion's conservatism about reforms that affect their own welfare. The one
important provision in Part VII in this regard is section 7.17's limitation
of the fee award to a "reasonable proportion of the value of the relief...
obtained by the plaintiff for the corporation." 129 Properly enforced, such
a rule should curb the more egregious examples of settlements based on
cosmetic non-pecuniary relief and associated corporate therapeutics that
benefit the lawyer but not the shareholders.
In the last analysis, the Principles do not place their primary reliance on
courts or litigation. Litigation is ultimately a failsafe remedy, a safety net
126. Punitive damages for breaches of fiduciary duty by a corporate official received
relatively little attention in the case law. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that
punitive damages are appropriate "for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's
evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(2) (1979). Certainly, some fiduciary violations could satisfy this standard. At common
law, the law of trusts generally does not allow punitive damages, but it makes exceptions "in
cases of extraordinary fiduciary disloyalty or malicious conduct." See Leigh v. Engle, 669 F.
Supp. 1390, 1413 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 858 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1078 (1989); GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 862, at 39-41 (2d ed. 1982). For a recent case authorizing punitive damages against trustees
as a matter of federal common law, see Ampere Automotive Corp. v. Employee Benefit Plans,
Inc., No. 92 C 2580, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 601 (E.D. 111. Jan. 21, 1993).
127. For a review of the empirical studies, see Principles, supra note *, pt. VII Introductory
Note. See also supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
128. Sixty-six percent of the derivative actions in Professor Romano's study settled. See
Romano, supra note 116, at 63-70.
129. Principles, supra note *, § 7.17.
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for instances when other mechanisms fail. Under Part VII, the court's role
is essentially confined to those instances when the board cannot give a
reasonable account for its actions in rejecting the shareholder's demand.
In essence, this defines when the safety net is needed. Those who would
remove the safety net at this point should bear the burden of explaining
why it is prudent to do so.
